No Research in a Muted Country – On Academic Neutrality and Survival Science in Georgia

by Ina Kaplanishvili

“My student has been arrested“- a sentence often repeated among Georgian lecturers today.

I first learned about Max Weber’s principle of neutrality, the necessity of demarcating “is“ from “ought“, science from politics, during my bachelor studies. At that early stage, I accepted that idea almost uncritically.

Later, I encountered Hannah Arendt’s work. I still remember a warning from my former lecturer: as researchers, we must remain attentive to the emergence of totalitarian regimes, driven by various political actors seeking power – often at unexpected times. Arendt (2017) reminds us that it’s often the “neutral“ masses – the so-called “silent majority“ who enable such regimes. So, while I continued to respect Max Weber’s principles of scientific ethos, the ongoing protest movement in Georgia, started in 2024, shook my remaining commitment to Weberian neutrality. The first wave of protests erupted after the “foreign agent law[1]” targeted NGOs and independent media. A second wave followed when the government delayed EU integration until 2028, a move seen as deepening ties with Russia, which occupies 20% of Georgian territory. Together, these sparked one of the largest protest movements in Georgia’s post-Soviet history. In this context, Arendt’s influence transformed neutrality from a respectable idea into something deeply problematic. Political attentiveness has since become part of my moral compass as a future researcher. This led me to ask whether it’s ethical, or even possible, to keep science and politics strictly separate today.

Picture 1:“Let’s take freedom into our own hands” – a protest banner on the fence of TSU’s main building. November 18, 2024. View the original photo on Radio Tavisupleba’s website. Photo © RFE/RL, by Gela Bochikashvili.

More importantly, I argue that it’s no longer just a personal choice for scientists to remain neutral. While science and politics have always been interwoven, in Georgia, this entanglement has become particularly visible, as politics -by the same old means- has directly entered academic spaces. At dawn on November 19, 2024, during a student protest at Tbilisi State University (TSU), the government deployed police forces onto campus to suppress the demonstrations. This was not metaphorical but physical invasion. When police walk into university lecture halls, academia enters what Kastenhofer (2024) calls a “survival mode” in which scientists become visibly activists and citizens and public intellectuals work not only to produce new knowledge, but to preserve the very space where knowledge can be made.

In Georgia, this is not only triggered by physical force but deepened by censorship and new legal restrictions that reshape what can be taught, discussed or funded in academia. In such moments, speaking out is not radical, it is vital. As Thierry et al. (2023) warned, there is “no research on a dead planet.” But what about a silenced university? A banned curriculum? A generation of students told not to ask certain questions? In my context, the warning is clear: without space for critical and independent inquiry, the kind of research necessary to challenge power and prevent authoritarianism becomes muted.

In response to police at university and ongoing protest suppression, many lecturers, professors at TSU’s Faculty of Social and Political Sciences issued a strong public statement, condemning the “brutal suppression of peaceful civil protests by law enforcement agencies” during which numerous journalists, ordinary citizens, students “injured through the use of disproportionate, and deliberate, force.”

Moreover, there was an institutional form of political interference. On September 17, 2024, the Georgian Parliament passed the Law on Family Values and the Protection of Minors. The government claims it protects “traditional” family structures, but in practice, it restricts the rights and visibility of sexual minorities. Its effects include educational institutions. Under the new law, not only schools but also universities are banned from “promoting“ or even discussing content that includes gender identities differing from biological sex or same-sex relationships.

In this case, politics did not arrive with batons, but with curriculum guidelines. Gender studies, queer theory and discussions of identity are now labeled as “propaganda.” As Teona Mataradze, a prominent sociologist and gender studies scholar, put it in an interview with Media Platform 64, “The MA program in Gender Studies at TSU, the first in the South Caucasus, loses its meaning under this law.”

So, instead of asking whether Georgian lecturers, most of whom are also active researchers, have the luxury of Weberian neutrality, we should ask what “neutrality” even means and does under these circumstances. Does “neutrality” mean to stay silent when policy dictates what we can teach and research? When funding is revoked for certain “banned” topics? As STS scholars have long argued, boundaries between academic inquiry and state power are often illusions; science and society are always entangled. In Georgia, these limits haven’t just blurred; they’ve been openly violated, pushing scholars into survival mode.

As Kastenhofer (2024) argues, we are now witnessing the rise of a “survival science”- a science that acknowledges the collapse of old rules due to societal changes and crises – climate emergency, threats to liberal democracies, growing inequality – that fundamentally change academic expectations, self-understanding and ethos, and force us to ask the question: “What are, and what should be, our new norms for science in society?” (p. 344). This includes, as Kastenhofer notes, “radical interventions“ like “scientists going on strike and taking to the streets” (p. 347).

That’s why, when Georgian researchers in the social and political sciences marched, spoke out and defended their students and academic values, I did not see these actions as unexpected or extreme – but as “radical interventions” that I understand not as political, but as academic acts carried out in survival mode, triggered by crises: threats to freedom of speech, the autonomy of academia and the presence of police forces at university. In Georgia too, academics have been forced to go further and ask a question that lies at the heart of survival science: what should science become when the basic conditions for doing science are under threat? I believe that in Georgia (as in the world), academics are in the process of creating the new moral and practical compass to guide them through survival – meaning a world full of uncertainty and societal crises. Seeing academics march and protest, lecturers speaking through microphones, and university classes held in the streets gives me the courage to say that this transformation – the creation of a new ethos – has already begun in Georgia.

And lastly, though this essay focuses on Georgia, the issue is borderless. In both non-democratic and democratic countries- even in the USA- academic freedom is increasingly at risk.


Ina Kaplanishvili is a Georgian master’s student in Science and Technology Studies at the University of Vienna, with a background in sociology from the Georgian Institute of Public Affairs (GIPA). Her current research interests include digital practices and technologies as actors in civic and protest engagement.


Bibliography

Arendt, H. (2017). The origins of totalitarianism. Penguin Classics.

Kastenhofer, K. (2024). From a normal and a post-normal science ethos towards a survival science ethos? GAIA – Ecological Perspectives for Science and Society, 33(4), 344-350. https://doi.org/10.14512/gaia.33.4.4

Thierry, A., Horn, L., von Hellermann, P., & Gardner, C. J. (2023). “No research on a dead planet”: Preserving the socio-ecological conditions for academia. Frontiers in Education, 8, Article 1237076. https://doi.org/10.3389/feduc.2023.1237076


[1] The document of „Law of Georgia on transparency of foreign influence“ (In English)

Dire wolves, Dire Consequences? De-extinction and technological solutionism

by Michal Nodzynski

When I was a kid, I was fascinated with dinosaurs and other examples of prehistoric fauna that have been long extinct. I often wondered how it would be to live among those species and interact with them.

And in a turn of events that would excite 10 year old me (and terrifies 30-year-old me), an American biotech company called Colossal Biosciences, announced on April 7th that it managed to ‘de-extinct’ Dire wolves through 3 puppies named Romulus, Remus and Khaleesi.

Dire wolves were ancient species of animals, believed to be related to gray wolves, that went extinct around 10,000 –13,000 years ago. In their prime, they were believed to inhabit a wide range of environments, from Canada in North America all the way down to Bolivia in South America.

The company managed to achieve this ‘de-extinction’ by editing 14 genes within the gray wolf genome to affect the phenotype (how the organism looks) of the wolves to resemble that of a dire wolf.

Promotional picture of the two gray wolf pups that the company genetically
modified to resemble dire wolves. Colossal Biosciences.

Now there has been already a serious discussion on whether the 3 puppies can be considered resurrected dire wolves or are just genetically modified gray wolves. It doesn’t help that there has been serious doubt whether modern gray wolves are actually the closest relatives of this extinct species. And on top of that, there are longstanding ethical issues connected with the practice of genetically modifying animals.

When it comes to ‘why?’ of ‘de-extinction, the leadership of the company points towards helping conservation efforts, increased biodiversity as well as potential way to combat climate change using de-extinct animals like mammoths to stop release of methane gas from thawing permafrost in the Arctic. This last theory is however not universally accepted by all researchers. For what it’s worth, George Church, geneticist and co-founder of Colossal Biosciences, compares such endeavours to “de-extinct” mammoths to “existing, rewilding projects” and seems not to be too concerned with potential implications of such “re-introduction”. This ‘downplaying’ of potential consequences could be beneficial for the public image of the company, and as such help with securing funding from private investors.

George R.R. Martin, author of ‘Game of Thrones’ fantasy book series,
holding one of the ‘dire wolf’ pups. The author was supposedly involved
in the process of de-extinction, and is even featured as one of the co-authors
of the pre-print paper that the company released on the preprint server bioRxiv.org.
George R. R. Martin

However, regardless of the validity of the claims about benefits of ‘de-extinction’ and soundness of scientific claims behind it, for me there is another angle that is worth exploring – the ‘techno-solutionist’ aspects of it.

Techno-solutionism is a term popularized by Evgeny Morozov in his book “To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism” (Morozov, 2013). The term is used there to describe the tendency of tech companies to look for digital solutions to different kinds of issues that contemporary societies deal with. Another term sometimes used interchangeably is ‘techno-fix’.

Whether it’s techno-solution or techno-fix, what I find interesting is the idea itself, that most societal problems could (and should) be addressed through the use of technology and innovation. The concept of ‘de-extinction’ very much embraces this way of thinking. Proponents of ‘de-extinction’ (such as George Church) emphasize that because issues, such as climate change, are so overwhelming and pressing, it justifies those unconventional approaches.

But techno-solutions often ignore that there exist well-researched and established ways of solving those issues. It’s just that often those solutions are not as ‘easy’ or as ‘quick’ as techno-solutionists would like them to be. Conservation efforts can be complicated, and they yield both successes and failures. But because they typically advocate restraint and harm reduction, they can be seen as ‘unattractive’ to those that prefer more decisive actions.

It’s also worth noting that conservational work is not universally opposed to use of modern technology. Frequently, conservational efforts take advantage of tools like tagging, drones or GPS data. Of course, even those technologies are not used uncritically. For example, the drones can be quite loud, and their deployment is only considered in cases where alternative, in-person intervention would be considered more disruptive to the environment.

And even so, those established technologies are sparsely used in the field. Researchers often highlight additional costs as well as poor adaptation of the equipment to the outdoor environment as one of the barriers to adapting technological tools in their work. In the end, the main issue in conservation isn’t lack of new technologies but lack of funding and interest from prominent stakeholders.

But what’s striking about those technologies in comparison to techno-fixes is what role they play in the process. Drones, satellites, and tags are there to support and enhance existing conservational frameworks. The work and research benefits from usage of those technologies, but does not depend entirely on them. The work could be done (albeit with more difficulty) without them. And in the end, the decision whether to use them or not is left to researchers and workers conducting those efforts.

On the other hand, techno-solutions often attempt to ‘disrupt’ established fields and completely change how issues are perceived and approached. And while this approach might work relatively well in markets focused on individual consumers[1] (such as consumer electronics or software) the consequences of failed ‘disruption’ in an environment-related field would be long-lasting and catastrophic.

The issue with techno-solutionist approach is that it not only ignores existing, non-technical, solutions, but it can even undermine them. Funding for conservation is already scarce and unevenly distributed. As such, some researchers worry that reallocating funds from undergoing conservation efforts towards de-extinction is simply not the most cost-efficient way to increase biodiversity.

Techno-solutions present a ‘quick’ technological fix that can appear to solve the problem without the need for deeper, structural changes, which more traditional approaches would call for. And when policymakers are both running out of time and money, techno-fixes can appear quite compelling.

It’s because of that need for urgency that techno-solutions are often proposed once ‘the issue’ reaches some sort of crisis. And this urgency can be then used as a way to legitimize those ‘fixes’ that otherwise would not be considered as a viable solution. For climate change, only now when the effects of it are obvious to everyone, are proponents of technologies such as Carbon Capture or Geoengineering becoming more bold and vocal about using them to address climate change.

Similar narratives can also be seen with ‘de-extinction’ movement. As conservation efforts become more difficult due to shifting political environments around the world, quick techno-fixes like ‘de-extinction’ can become more enticing to agencies and governments. In many ways, the tune changed from ‘there is no problem’ to ‘there is a problem, and we can only fix it now using technology’. This sense of urgency is a crucial element of techno-solutionisms, as it often allows it to bypass the usual assessment and public discussion that more established approaches require.

Technology might not be the solution, but it can definitely be part of it. But to do so, it has to work with people actively involved in conservational efforts and help them with addressing issues that they want to focus on. It also has to respect the voices and opinions of those that might be affected by deployment of said technologies. Conservational efforts to increase biodiversity shouldn’t have the same approach towards technology that in many cases caused the loss of said biodiversity.

It’s also worth highlighting that despite techno-solutionists claims that regulatory interventions don’t work – we have done that in the past. Remember the ozone layer hole? It’s still there, but studies have shown that since international efforts to reduce emissions of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) the ozone hole actually is slowly shrinking. This shows that coordinated, international regulatory efforts (which still include technological innovation) can work.

What personally scares me about techno-solutionist approach to conservational efforts is the potential for complete disregard for the well-being of currently living animals and their habitats. If we can ‘3D-print’ lions, why care about dying, sickly lions that currently roam the Earth? Let them die, and then we can just make more! It often seems easier to scrap everything and start from nothing rather than maintain what we might perceive as ‘flawed’ environment. We already see this type of thinking in politics when certain politicians call for heavy ‘budget cuts’ insisting on removing certain programs and funding with total disregard for how such cuts would affect people who rely on those funds. This might seem like a very pessimist view of de-extinction movement, but we’ve been similarly careless in the past with technologies of plastic, radioactive elements, nuclear waste. Techno-fixes of the past frequently ended up being equivalent of hiding the dirt under the rug and calling it ‘future-me’ problem. Except the future-us are the future generations that end up paying the price for our shortsightedness.

And honestly, Colossal Sciences shouldn’t try to impress 10-year-old me. If for no other reason, than simply because he was terrified of wolves.


Michal Nodzynski is a masters’ student at the Science and Technology Studies department of the University of Vienna. With background in molecular biology, his interests include how research in Life Sciences are conducted and communicated, with focus on perceptions of failures in research. Outside of academia, Michal is a huge nerd who enjoys fantasy novels and Tabletop Role-playing Games.


[1] Unfortunately, Colossal Biosciences approach to de-extinction seems to be close to Silicon Valley ethos of ‘move fast and break things’. Despite employing researchers, the company doesn’t publish their results in peer-reviewed journals and announces their results through press releases and photoshoots. There are very few instances where a company actually backs-up their claims with actual research (one rare example of that is the aforementioned 2025 preprint). Typical of techno-solutionism, the company promises quick and impressive results but is unable to explain how it plans to achieve them or even document what it has done so far. Not to mention addressing potential consequences of their interventions.

Can a Cloud Catch Fire?

by Carsten Horn

On the morning of 10 March of 2021, players of the online chess application Lichess, visitors to the website of the Centre Georges-Pompidou in Paris, the organizers of the Paris fashion week, a group of cybercriminals and a number of businesses were in for an unpleasant surprise. Data that they had thought to be safely stored in “the cloud” was gone! The reason: Around midnight, one of the four data centers operated by the market-leading French telecommunication and internet provider OVHcloud in Strasbourg, close to the German border on the river Rhine, had gone up in flames and another one had been severely damaged. The fire destroyed the servers which constitute the main infrastructure for part of the internet in the French internet domain and host the data of the data centers’ clients. More than two years later, despite the – typical – secrecy of the data center industry, information about the fire and the efforts to extinguish it were published. The fire had started in a power supply room and quickly spread throughout the five-storey building, leading to the devastating outcome.

In most cases, the fire probably had no long-lasting repercussions. The data stored in data centers is typically mirrored in multiple locations, leading to what Alexander R.E. Taylor (2018) calls an “infrastructural excess”. In my fieldwork, I learned for example that the streaming provider Netflix has its entire library mirrored in almost all co-location data centers worldwide. Yet, I cannot help but take the fire as an opportunity to think about what this event can teach us about our contemporary digital societies.  “Event” takes on a quite specific, and deeply philosophical meaning here. The event, as Mike Michael and Maja Horst (2011, p. 286) understand it, “is characterised by the fact that the interactions of it its constitutive elements change those elements”. In other words, in an event all actors that are part of it are transformed, they become otherwise.

Photograph of the OVH data centre on fire (Image: Xavier Garreau)

From a Burning Data Centers to Fire Objects

What are these transformations and how can we make sense of them? There is by now an emerging field of scholars in STS that engages with flammable objects, such as batteries. In a world that is getting increasingly hotter and is increasingly using highly-flammable objects, these scholars argue, we must come to terms with such fires. This would be a fitting approach; the Strasbourg fire shows that data centres are yet another highly-flammable object. That is why so much effort is spent on constructing fire extinguishing systems that put out fires but do not damage the servers and, consequently, the data stored on them (typically such systems thus use gas instead of water). But this is not what I’m after. At the cost of being too ironic and making use of what one could call a form of conceptual serendipity, I suggest we can think about the actual fire in Strasbourg in the spring of 2021 through the metaphor of the “fire object” coined by John Law and Vicky Singleton (2005) in a study on alcoholic liver disease (ALD). In this study, Law and Singleton find that none of the previous notions of what an object is can help them to think about the dynamics of their object of research. It is not as stable, or rather, as stabilized as the quasi-objects of Actor-Network Theory (ANT). But neither is it as neatly and continuously changing as the “fluid object” in the famous case of the Zimbabwe Bush Pump.

By contrast, ALD is a relational object in multiple versions that are juxtaposed and interrelated at the same time. That is, each version is part of a present reality that co-exists with the absent realities of other versions of alcoholic liver disease. The authors call this a “fire object” because they liken it to the flames of a fire. These flames that we may observe in the present are likewise related to the absent presences of fuel and ashes. Unlike the fluid object where we can observe a somewhat continuous flow of the same reality of the object, even where it transforms, the transitions between the different realities of the fire object are discontinuous. They “jump” (Law & Singleton, 2005), p. 347) and, with the flip of a switch, a present reality is transformed into an absent present reality and makes way for another present reality.

Lessons from the Fire at the Strasbourg Data Center

What I suggest is that the event, that transpired in the night from 9 to 10 March on the banks of the River Rhine in Strasbourg, helps us to understand that “the cloud” is a fire object in a way akin to how Law and Singleton theorize ALD. The actual fire at the data center marks precisely the moment when the metaphorical fire object and its reality abruptly and brutally shift. This is, I suggest, more than a typical case of infrastructural breakdown. For STSers, infrastructural breakdown occupies a privileged epistemological position because it is here that we see the work that infrastructure(s) invisibly do. This is why infrastructure scholars speak of breakdown as a form of “infrastructural inversion” (Star & Ruhleder, 1996). The fire at OVHcloud is more than just infrastructural breakdown because the very reality of the cloud, the fire object, changed with the fire. For users, the cloud overnight transformed from an ethereal domain into a very real building at the outskirts of the capital of Alsace in France.

I want to dwell on three aspects of the new reality that emerged in the event of the fire because I believe it can tell us something about contemporary digital societies and the possibilities for them to be otherwise.

1. We are not really used to thinking about our data. It is just there – after all, this is the etymological root of the term itself (from Latin datum, given). This is what the cloud is for, right?! We use it to safely store our data, never to worry about it again because it is just there (Brennan, 2016). Digital technologies and infrastructures have made it possible to store everything at a click and without thinking twice. This has changed how we archive things. Our ‘archives’ have become “dumpsters” (Hogan, 2015) just because they have become technically so easy to produce at little to no (financial) cost.

The fire at OHVcloud changes this. It suddenly creates a chance for a more conscious relation with our data. Data is not just given and will always be there when we need it. If you were playing chess on Lichess in March of 2021, there is a real possibility that your progress was lost – quite literally – in the flames. Can the fire thus perhaps be the start of a new form of data and data infrastructure literacy where we consider more consciously what we store and where we store it?

2. Relatedly, the reality of “the cloud” itself changes. Consider, this insight from an article titled “Europe’s data treasure burns on the Rhine” from the German news outlet Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ): “[O]f course, the cloud is just a metaphor”.  As scholars of science and technology know all too well, language is performative, metaphors do work. In this case, they render invisible what it actually means to store data “in the cloud”. It surely does not mean that we transfer our “data treasure” to some kind of ephemeral and immaterial realm. This is why the argument that when we speak of “the cloud” we actually mean a global, very material network of digital infrastructures is well-rehearsed in the literature on data centers. Jennifer Holt and Patrick Vonderau (2015, p. 75), for instance, want to study data centers as the places “where ‘the cloud’ touches the ground” and as “the physical presence of this imaginary space”. The fire at OHVcloud might have achieved this. It has, at least for a short moment in time, generated a reality in which the material ingredients of ‘the cloud’ are visible. Beyond the methodological commonplace that infrastructure (only) becomes visible upon breakdown, this may be the point of departure for political debates around data centers. To quote again from the above-mentioned article in the FAZ: “The accident shows that there urgently needs to be a public discussion about where, by whom, under what conditions and how securely our data is stored”. I would add that this public discussion must not neglect the massive environmental costs data centers have due to their energy and water consumption, the raw materials necessary to construct the servers they house and the ruins and e-waste they leave behind.

3. There is a final lesson we can draw from the data center fire (object). It points us to the new fragilities of the digital age. In an article published by Vice News on the day of the fire, Lorenzo Fraceschi-Bicchierai remarks that the fire “shows how things we often think of as ‘cyber’ have a very real physical infrastructure that can be attacked, impacted by disasters, or otherwise messed with”. This insight follows from what I have written above. If “the cloud” is not ethereal but very material and on the ground, it is at risk of whatever kind of catastrophe we can imagine, for example, a fire. It is not for nothing that, as I have learned in my fieldwork, that data centres in Vienna are not built in the approach path of the airport, as the however-improbable risk that a plane crash may destroy our valuable data is too large. What does this fragility entail? Irish poet Jessica Traynor writes that data centers have become our “memory machines”. Our collective memory is now stored digitally and, hence, at risk of our new digital fragilities. Traynor puts it succinctly: “Rather than creating something permanent and inviolable, we’ve made our memories more contingent than ever upon a fantasy of technological stability that, given the constant churn of history, seems inevitably fleeting.” Lo and behold, this also concerns the data that keeps our administrations going, that pertains us as citizens. OVHcloud also housed French government data. Some businesses lost parts of their data forever – as illustrated by lawsuits against OVHVcloud. So, given the ever-growing dependency on digital technologies and growing geopolitical tensions, what risks are we willing to take, what fragilities are we willing to bear, when it comes to our cultural memories?

The story I tell about the fire at OHVcloud could easily be one repair and maintenance (Denis, Mongili & Pontille, 2016). After firefighters had extinguished the flames, the damages could be assessed, servers could be replaced, and operations could continue – almost seamlessly. In this story, the fire would have been but a noise in the system. The event would have been tamed before it would have become durable. We would have easily gone back to the old reality, perhaps before even noticing a reality shift. Indeed, the architecture of digital infrastructures and labor inside data centers aim to prevent downtime at all costs. Failure and breakdown thus lose their epistemological significance because they are so easily glossed over (Taylor, 2021).

The notion of the “fire object” makes us aware that the reality that would thus have been restored has lost its innocence. It is haunted by the spectre of the absent presence of the alter-reality the fire brought about. “Fire object” entices us to look for the absent presence of this alter-reality, of which the (metaphorical) ashes of the fire in Strasbourg serve as a reminder; of a glimpse we caught in the days following 10 March, 2021. It also points us to the difficulties of bringing the multiple realities we live in together. For instance, there has been a long investigation of the causes of the fire and, as I mentioned above, several lawsuits as clients have sued the company for the data loss (in the absence of backup-storage policies). Ultimately, the notion of the “fire object” calls upon us to keep the event open. A cloud can catch fire. If and when it does, it presents an opportunity to become more aware of the (environmental) fragilities of digital societies and to make digital infrastructures more democratic and sustainable.


Carsten Horn is a doctoral candidate in the ERC-funded research project “Innovation Residues. Modes and Infrastructures of Caring for our Longue-durée Environmental Futures” at  the STS Department. He investigates the residues of digital practices, digitalization and datafication at the interface of digital and environmental concerns. In his dissertation project “Datafication and its Discontents”, Carsten studies the emerging controversies around data centers in Austria, France and Ireland.


References

Brennan, S. (2016). Making Data Sustainable: Backup Culture and Risk Perception. In N. Starosielski & J. Walker (Eds.), Sustainable Media (pp. 56–76). Routledge.

Denis, J., Mongili, A., & Pontille, D. (2016). Maintenance & Repair in Science and Technology Studies. TECNOSCIENZA: Italian Journal of Science & Technology Studies, 6(2), Article 2.

Hogan, M. (2015). The Archive as Dumpster. Pivot: A Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies and Thought, 4(1), Article 1. https://doi.org/10.25071/2369-7326.39565

Holt, J., & Vonderau, P. (2015). “Where the Internet Lives”. Data Centers as Cloud Infrastructures. In L. Parks & N. Starosielski (Eds.), Signal Traffic. Critical Studies of Media Infrastructures (pp. 71–93). University of Illinois Press.

Horst, M., & Michael, M. (2011). On the Shoulders of Idiots: Re-thinking Science Communication as ‘Event.’ Science as Culture, 20(3), 283–306. https://doi.org/10.1080/09505431.2010.524199

Law, J., & Singleton, V. (2005). Object Lessons. Organization, 12(3), 331–355. https://doi.org/10.1177/1350508405051270

Star, S. L., & Ruhleder, K. (1996). Steps Toward an Ecology of Infrastructure: Design and Access for Large Information Spaces. Information Systems Research, 7(1), 111–134.

Taylor, A. R. E. (2018, May 19). Failover Architectures: The Infrastructural Excess of the Data Centre Industry. Failed Architecture. https://failedarchitecture.com/failover-architectures-the-infrastructural-excess-of-the-data-centre-industry/

Taylor, A. R. E. (2021). Standing by for data loss: Failure, preparedness and the cloud. Ephemera: Theory & Politcs in Organization, 21(1), 59–93.

What’s it like working as a researcher?

By Sara Ortega Ramírez


“When I say, bluntly, that I am interested in learning how citizens in two countries make sense and care for the problem of nuclear residues, I can notice that they seem initially fascinated by the topic… but nevertheless, they don´t fully understand many things, such as why I want to know that… and perhaps the hardest question, what is the purpose of this? What is its utility?”


What do you do for a living? is a common question when meeting new people. A question not easy to answer if you are working in academia while doing a PhD, and the person asking this is not at all familiar with the academic world. Facing this question and the following one, such as, “what is your PhD subject?” has brought me serious challenges when trying to answer, leaving me wondering to myself about the sense and the purpose of working as a researcher in social sciences.  

It took me one full year to finally build my PhD project —my exposé— to be able to present it in front of the Doctoral School board of social sciences and be accepted. I can attest how the nebulousness I experienced during the first months when trying to explain to other people what I was doing started to become clearer, and I ended up feeling comfortable and being able to put into words what my subject and research interest are. However, this clarity doesn’t seem to reach others —relatives or strangers— who are not related to academia.

When I say, bluntly, that I am interested in learning how citizens in two countries make sense and care for the problem of nuclear residues, I can notice that they seem initially fascinated by the topic (I guess this is because they heard the word “nuclear”); but nevertheless, they don´t fully understand many things, such as why I want to know that, what I do in order to know that (what I do in a regular workday) and, finally, and perhaps the hardest question, what is the purpose of this? What is its utility?

If I am sincere, I’d just reply to the latter question that the relevance for me is to start to discuss, to mobilise among people, complicated issues that must be discussed collectively because they affect in several ways ours and others’ ways of living. Furthermore, as at any point in time decisions should be made concerning this kind of issues, it is better for us, as citizens, not only to be just informed but to have discussed this as a collective. But when I reply this, it still seems like this type of job remains at an abstract level. I am justifying knowledge by knowledge, as in a vicious circle.

This type of knowledge —i.e. how people think about nuclear residues— may be relevant for academia, but how does this matter to the economy of a country? To the well-being of the citizens? This does not sound like something useful in the sense of other jobs such as cleaners, doctors, designers, garbage collectors, lawyers, etc.

This had made me wonder about the characteristics of ‘research’ as a job, and not just as practice and passion. I cannot pinpoint specifically the usefulness of my job as I cannot have any type of certainty about how and by whom this knowledge will be used, and this can be disappointing, as it touches the ethical dimension and the responsibility implied in the research enterprise. I believe I cannot have a final answer to this.

I may have not the tools to fully explain to (or perhaps convince?) people not related to academia the importance of my job; nevertheless, it is still highly important —and valuable— at least for me, my supervisor, colleagues and the STS department, and hopefully it will be to some extent for academia as well. I guess we are just all performing different ways of valuing things.


Sara Ortega Ramírez is a doctoral candidate in the ERC-funded research project “Innovation Residues. Modes and Infrastructures of Caring for our Longue-durée Environmental Futures” at  the STS Department.

Science Per Unit Time: Insights into Living in Space

by Lucas Nensel

Creator’s Statement

Science Per Unit Time: Insights into Living in Space assembles archival footage and reports of the third manned mission aboard the Skylab space station, and explores conflicts within the space mission related to time. Skylab was the United States’ first space station, launched by NASA, and occupied for about 24 weeks between May 1973 and February 1974. Skylab 4 was the third and longest space mission to its date, and housed a number of tests in order to understand how people could live in outer space for an extended period of time. The crew conducted extensive scientific experiments, including solar observations and medical studies, while overcoming early challenges such as space sickness and heavy workloads. These challenges would lead to Skylab 4 becoming infamous for the first supposed strike or mutiny in space, when the astronauts stopped communications with the ground.

The opening minute of the video essay is intended to highlight the multiplicity of time by the question of “where to start” thinking about time in space. A convoluted question that is answered in multiple ways; the imaginaries of NASA, how the mission is deemed useful, and the pre-flight phase that contains dozens of plans for the mission. A synchronisation between the ticking clock in the background and the countdown to the astronauts’ rocket launch is intended to bring back to the conflict that would define Skylab‘s legacy. From here, the essay explores the mission as an exemplary case for the conflictual potential between the Newtonian time – or clock time – and time as an embodied and experienced phenomenon. When Barbara Adam (1998, 40) describes clock time, it is in relation to technological artefacts, following the Newtonian principles of decontextualisation, fragmentation, predictability, abstract space and time; or in other words, “without concern for the life-cycle of a product, without reference to its interaction with the environment, without recognition that the created artefact forms an integral part of the world-wide web of interconnected processes”. In Skylab, we follow three astronauts, engulfed in these Newtonian principles, which are not only ever-present in the technological make-up of the space station, but also in the daily scientific practice and experiments performed by the three scientists. Moreover, Skylab 4 became an experiment itself, testing what might happen when humans live for a long period of time in space. As such, as an essential feature, the clock is always in the background.

Only once does the video look into the perspective of the astronauts of what time meant for them during the mission. It goes from “ as much science per unit time” – as per the directive of the mission – to feelings of hurriedness, tiredness, pressure, and an abundance of conflict in which the demarcation of time became the centre of the struggle. As such, work becomes an inevitable axis to explore this conflict. The hectic jumps between all the areas of work represent not only the working atmosphere, but also the sheer load of tasks that the astronauts were expected to fulfil day in and day out. What we find in between this mountain of material is the reasoning for needing humans in space, but also what it means to have humanity in space. Sickness, curiosity, decision-making, rebellion, and enjoyment (to name a few) need room when living in space – just as much as they are part of human life on Earth.

The archival footage and interviews with Gerald Carr and Edward Gibson form the basis of the essay. In addition, a few screenshots from the missions press conference, air-ground transcripts, and a few title cards are being used to form an investigative narrator who, along with the audience, forms questions toward the material and finds himself flipping to the pages, comparing them to the video material. Further, the text elements highlight certain aspects that are deemed important for guiding the audience toward the experiences of the crew in the space mission. This gesture intends to invoke a sense of controversy, that may further spark the audience to form questions and second guess what they see. My reason for this is that Skylab 4’s legacy itself is debated among the press, NASA, and the astronauts themselves, to which extent the activities on Skylab count as a true strike in space or mutiny. As Brooker (2019-20) points out in his podcast series, it can be frustrating that in a case such as Skylab, there was little attention given to these labor conflicts and far more to whether a strike actually happened, or to the quantitative measurements of living in space. This essay, as such, tries to make space for the qualitative experience of what happened at Skylab. In contrast to the arranged material, which is a collage from different kinds of NASA publications, there is one piece that is ever present in the essay; Tick-Tock by Hans Zimmer: a piece from the soundtrack for the science-fiction film Interstellar, prominently featuring a ticking clock in its foundation. The idea here is to convey a sense of urgency, felt also by the astronauts from time to time again, when the mission’s design, and decision-making by planners and controllers, pushed the astronauts to the bearable limit of working hours. Further, the sound is there to remind us of the ever-present feature of time as a controlled unit and should contrast with the work environment in such a way that it feels alien at times. The video essay ends in a moment of relief from the clock, when the orchestra overshadows the ticking noise as the astronauts are seen running in circles in near zero-g, enjoying their weightless environment. However, while the image fades black, the sound of the clock creeps back in; a reminder that human moments like these—of escape from the clock—were rare but precious. As such, this video essay is a reflection on the Skylab 4 mission’s struggles, and also a meditation on the intricate dance between human experience and the technological frameworks that define space missions.

Thinking on Screen

“Science per Unit Time” was made during the short course titled “Thinking on Screen: Exploring the Video Essay as a Research Method for STS”, led by Joseph Popper and hosted by the STS Department at the University of Vienna. The course introduces the video essay and essay film as particular media forms and modes of research, and experiments with audiovisual ways of articulating a thinking process. Image, sound, and words form the essential materials for presenting thoughts on screen, and amplifying voices of researchers as they explore their chosen subjects.

Author Biography

Lucas Nensel is a masters’ student in the Science and Technology Studies Master programme at the University of Vienna. Lucas previously completed his Theatre–, Film– and Media Studies Bachelor, also at the University of Vienna. In 2022, Lucas and his colleague started a film production company called 3zu2 Filmproduktion in Rostock (Germany), where he works as a producer, director, writer and in an editorial position for feature film, documentaries and other productions.

References

Adam, B. (1998). Timescapes of Modernity: The Environment and Invisible Hazards. London: Routledge.

Brooker, Phillip. 2019-2020. Skylab: ASOS…IN SPAAAAACCCEEEE!!!!! (podcast mini-series). Skylab: Living and Working in Space. June 2019 – February 2020. Accessed 30 January 2024.

A Conversation on AI Policy, Governance, and the Making of Academic Work

A conversation between Bao-Chau (Bao-Chi) Pham and Katja Mayer

We’re excited to share an interview with our colleague Bao-Chi, whose recent publications on artificial intelligence policy and governance offer fresh and critical insights into the field. Bao-Chi’s work highlights the socio-political imaginaries of AI, focusing on concepts such as risk, trust, and how global contexts shape perceptions of AI’s challenges and opportunities. These papers not only enrich scholarly debates but also provide a window into the process of academic publishing itself—a process of making knowledge that often remains invisible.

Katja: In this conversation, we’re taking a dual approach. First, we explore the content of Bao-Chi’s papers—their core arguments and contributions to the field of AI policy and governance. Then, we shift focus to the process—the often overlooked aspects of research, writing, collaboration, and peer review that shaped the final publications.

We believe that reflecting on how scholarly work is produced is as important as discussing what it argues. By uncovering these processes, we aim to demystify academic publishing and inspire reflection on our collective research practices.

Bao-Chi, could you start by introducing yourself and telling us about your PhD journey? What led you to focus on AI governance, and how did these two papers emerge from your research?

Bao-Chi: Thanks a lot for the introduction, Katja. Since joining the Vienna STS department in September 2020, I’ve been working on my PhD project “Imagining and Governing Artificial Intelligence in Europe”. My research explores how AI and Europe are co-produced in political and policy discussions. In other words, I study imaginaries that shape these conversations and how particular visions of AI and “Europeanness” are enacted, circulated, and stabilized.

The two papers we’re discussing today are part of my cumulative dissertation. The first, co-authored with my supervisor Sarah Davies, was published in Critical Policy Studies under the title: What problems is the AI Act solving? Technological solutionism, fundamental rights, and trustworthiness in European AI policy.

In this paper, we examine the European Union’s AI Act, a regulatory framework initiated by the European Commission, which came into force on 1 August 2024. Among other concrete measures, the AI Act introduces a risk-based tier system that stipulates what kind of oversight measures the AI systems deployed and implemented in Europe are subjected to.

“…the AI Act enacts a particular vision of Europe – one that positions the EU as an exceptional regulatory leader and reinforces the idea of the EU as a coherent political community. This, in turn, forecloses other possible ways of characterizing and addressing AI as a policy issue.

The two papers we’re discussing today are part of my cumulative dissertation. The first, co-authored with my supervisor Sarah Davies, was published in Critical Policy Studies under the title What problems is the AI Act solving? Technological solutionism, fundamental rights, and trustworthiness in European AI policy. In this paper, we examine the European Union’s AI Act, a regulatory framework initiated by the European Commission, which came into force on 1 August 2024. Among other concrete measures, the AI Act introduces a risk-based tier system that stipulates what kind of oversight measures the AI systems deployed and implemented in Europe are subjected to.

We analyse the AI Act using Carol Bacchi’s What’s the Problem Represented to Be? (WPR) approach, which highlights how policies actively construct the very problems they claim to address. By focusing on the AI Act’s risk-based classification system, we unpack how AI is problematized within EU policy-making. Beyond that, we consider the effects of these problem representations – not just in terms of measurable policy outcomes but also in what John Law refers to as collateral realities. Our key argument is that the AI Act enacts a particular vision of Europe – one that positions the EU as an exceptional regulatory leader and reinforces the idea of the EU as a coherent political community. This, in turn, forecloses other possible ways of characterizing and addressing AI as a policy issue.

The second paper, Trust in AI: Producing Ontological Security through Governmental Visions published in Cooperation & Conflict, is co-authored with Stefka Schmid (TU Darmstadt) and Anna-Katharina Ferl (Stanford University) and emerged from our interdisciplinary discussions on AI governance and security. We take a comparative approach, analysing EU, US, and Chinese AI policy documents to explore how AI is framed as a security concern, not just in military but also in civilian contexts.

Our key argument is that AI policies shape future visions by fostering ontological security – a sense of stability and continuity in a state’s identity which is reaffirmed, for example, through the performance of familiar routines and narratives, and the maintenance of relationships. While AI is often framed as a national security threat, we find that policies also draw on Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) concepts, such as trust, to position AI as a manageable and governable object. By introducing ontological security into AI governance debates, our paper highlights how policies don’t just regulate AI as a technology. They also help governments and institutions maintain a stable self-image by positioning AI as something controllable, thereby reinforcing trust in governments.

The Writing Process: From Ideas to Published Work

Bao-Chi: Looking back, both papers were shaped by informal exchanges and unexpected opportunities, and both stem from conference experiences.

The first paper emerged from a workshop in Graz in September 2021, organized by STS Austria. I wasn’t presenting my own research but a collaborative autoethnography project with our colleagues Fredy Mora Gámez, Andrea Schikowitz, Sarah Davies, and Esther Dessewffy. One evening, Nina Klimburg-Witjes mentioned that she and Paul Trauttmansdorff were editing a volume called Technopolitics and the Making of Europe Infrastructures of Security, bringing together debates from STS and Critical Security Studies. She asked whether Sarah and I would be interested in contributing a chapter on AI. At that point, I had only just begun my empirical work on European AI policy, but we agreed it was a great opportunity. Writing that chapter, in which we conceptualized AI policy as infrastructure, was the springboard for our paper.

When Sarah and I began working on the paper, I came across the WPR approach. Bacchi and Goodwin’s Poststructural Policy Analysis: A Guide to Practice (2016) was particularly helpful in my own grappling with a core STS principle: that things could be otherwise. The idea that policies don’t just respond to problems but actively shape what is seen as a problem aligned closely with my interest in the co-production of AI and Europe. The WPR approach also provided a practical way to navigate the AI Act, a dense and technical legal text. The framework’s seven guiding questions structured our analysis and allowed us to address audiences beyond STS, particularly policy-makers and practitioners. In many ways, applying WPR to the AI Act was a way to translate STS sensibilities to a broader audience.

Similarly, the second paper emerged from a conference experience. In 2021, I submitted an abstract to the Science, Peace, and Security conference. A few weeks later, the organizers emailed me, copying in another participant whose abstract was very similar. They suggested we either collaborate or decide who would present, while the other could produce a poster. I remember feeling apprehensive: was this my first encounter with the infamous competitiveness of academia? I was very happy to collaborate, but I also wondered: was that the “strategic choice” an early-career researcher should make? Anna and I reached out to each other, got along brilliantly, and decided to work together. Stefka was in the online audience during our presentation and later reached out because she was intrigued by our use of sociotechnical imaginaries. She was working on a comparative project on AI governance and suggested we collaborate.

As we developed the paper, we turned to the concept of ontological security, which we hadn’t yet seen discussed much in relation to AI. AI policy, especially in international relations and military contexts, often focuses on hard security, meaning physical threats to state sovereignty or military stability. We were interested in what else these policies were doing. Drawing on Lupovici’s work (2022) on ontological security and cybersecurity, we explored how AI policies don’t just address external threats but also help sustain a sense of stability and identity.

In this way, both conceptual approaches – WPR and ontological security – helped my co-authors and me to move beyond instrumental, techno-solutionist understandings of AI governance. They allowed us to ask what policies do beyond regulating technology: how they shape identities and visions of the future. These perspectives also make our work more accessible to broader audiences. The WPR approach offers a structured way to reflect on how policy frames the problems it addresses. Ontological security, meanwhile, provides a language for thinking about AI policy not just in terms of risk management or security threats but in terms of how states and institutions construct meaning and stability alongside technological change.

The Role of Collaboration

“…having regular discussions with our colleagues about what counts as authorship, how to acknowledge contributions, and what is expected of each collaborator was immensely helpful in setting and managing expectations and workload.”

Bao-Chi: Absolutely, collaboration was central to both papers, but the experiences were quite different, each shaping my growth as a researcher.

Working with Sarah on the first paper was my first journal article and my first as a lead author. Writing with someone more experienced and in a clear position of seniority brought a certain safety but also required some navigation. On the one hand, I benefited enormously from Sarah’s guidance, particularly in structuring the paper, crafting a clear argument, and writing for an academic audience. On the other, I was learning to find my own voice as an early-career researcher, constantly asking myself, “What do I think is important? What do I want to say, and how? Is this good enough for an academic publication (and ultimately for my PhD)?” More than once, I felt stuck, procrastinated, and pushed back deadlines. This didn’t feel great in a collaboration, especially with my supervisor. I really appreciated Sarah’s patience and encouragement, and that she didn’t “need” this paper for her publication record – it was about getting me over the line with my first paper – and she was happy to let me take the lead and work at my own pace.

Here, having regular discussions with our colleagues about what counts as authorship, how to acknowledge contributions, and what is expected of each collaborator was immensely helpful in setting and managing expectations and workload. It also proved incredibly useful for the second collaboration, which had a very different setup.

Stefka, Anna, and I work in different disciplines (Computer Science, Peace Studies, and STS) and at different institutions in Germany and Austria. We were also all PhD candidates at the time. All of this meant that integrating our perspectives took extra effort. Our collaboration was mostly mediated by digital tools – Zoom for discussions, Stefka’s university’s cloud system for file-sharing, and Overleaf, a LaTeX editor, for drafting, which – I’ll be honest – was clunky at times! But those logistical hurdles were secondary to the real task: ensuring all three of our voices were present in the paper. Since for two of us the paper counts towards our dissertations, it felt particularly important that we each saw ourselves reflected in the final text.

“I also realized how much I had taken certain STS tenets for granted, such as that technologies don’t simply exist but are always co-produced with societal and political orderings. Explicitly articulating that to my collaborators, both in writing and discussions, made me more aware of my own assumptions”

The first paper gave me practical experience to write in an STS style and to develop a clearer sense of what “good writing” looks like in our field. That, in turn, helped me push back at certain points in the second paper’s interdisciplinary writing process when I felt the STS perspective risked getting lost. At the same time, I was also learning from my co-authors: both Stefka and Anna would highlight aspects that required more precision in their own disciplines. I started to notice a shift in my role – from receiving feedback on my first paper to flagging when our argument needed sharpening in the second paper. I also realized how much I had taken certain STS tenets for granted, such as that technologies don’t simply exist but are always co-produced with societal and political orderings. Explicitly articulating that to my collaborators, both in writing and discussions, made me more aware of my own assumptions.

In short, both collaborations shaped me in different ways. The first paper grounded me as an STS scholar; the second challenged me to articulate that position in a broader interdisciplinary conversation while also learning from other disciplines and their conventions.

The Peer Review Journey

“Having someone engage thoughtfully and thoroughly with our work felt like entering into a conversation, rather than receiving a one-sided judgment”

Katja: The peer review process is often challenging yet transformative. How did it shape your papers? Did you adapt your writing style for different journals or audiences? What was it like navigating reviewer feedback, and how long did the process take? We’d love to hear any advice you have for early-career researchers about managing revisions and responding to reviewer comments constructively.

Bao-Chi: I was initially apprehensive about the peer review process, especially with cautionary tales and the notorious “reviewer 2” memes circulating online. However, I was pleasantly surprised by how constructive and insightful the reviews were, despite the process not being entirely smooth (but then, which review process ever is?).

For the first paper, the review process took 15 months from submission to publication. Instead of harsh comments, reviewer 2’s feedback was minimal – only one sentence – so the editor reached out to a third reviewer for a more substantial response. Despite the lengthy process, the feedback was very helpful in refining the argument. In particular, the reviewers criticized the policy solution we aimed to unpack using the seven-step WPR approach. This led us to focus on the AI Act’s risk-based classification system, rather than the more ambiguous “trustworthy AI” policy discourse, which, I think, ultimately strengthened our paper.

Having someone engage thoughtfully and thoroughly with our work felt like entering into a conversation, rather than receiving a one-sided judgment. Sarah also introduced me to a very useful system for addressing peer review, which I’ve continued to use ever since: creating a table with each comment and treating it like a to-do list. This made the revision process more structured and helped me manage what would otherwise feel incredibly overwhelming.

For the paper with Stefka and Anna, we received a desk rejection from another journal just before Christmas. Had I been on my own, I might have been discouraged by the setback, but I am grateful that Stefka quickly resubmitted the paper to Cooperation and Conflict and after review and 9 months, the paper was accepted.

In terms of revisions, the feedback helped us sharpen our argument and better highlight our contribution. For example, one reviewer suggested we clarify the literature we were engaging with, suggesting to better contextualize and acknowledge the works we were drawing on. This not only strengthened our own contribution but also helped us link to the literature more effectively into the empirical sections. Having an external voice pointing out areas where we had made implicit connections that were unclear to readers was very useful in streamlining and signposting our text.

Overall, I found the review process to be far more collaborative and rewarding than I had expected (though, it definitely helped that both papers were co-authored to begin with). It reminded me that revision is an essential part of the academic writing journey, that can help sharpen ideas and strengthen the argument.

A final piece of advice: treating the review process like a to-do list has been extremely useful to me in knowing when to stop editing. It gives you a clear goal: addressing all the comments, either by integrating them into the text or justifying why you chose not to, helped me understand when the papers were “ready” for publication. This is something we often don’t have when preparing papers for initial submission.

Wrapping Up: Reflecting on Key Themes

Katja: Before we close, let’s return to the papers’ content. What key themes connect them? What motivates you in your research, and what messages were you aiming to convey? How do you see these papers contributing to ongoing debates in AI governance?

“AI policy is not just about managing technological risks and their implications but also actively shapes how AI is understood and governed – that is, how AI is made doable and thinkable… policy shapes what AI is understood to be and what kinds of futures become possible.”

Bao-Chi: A key theme in both papers is that AI policy is not just about managing technological risks and their implications but also actively shapes how AI is understood and governed – that is, how AI is made doable and thinkable. In other words, policy shapes what AI is understood to be and what kinds of futures become possible. Both papers therefore take a co-productionist perspective, highlighting how policy is neither neutral nor inevitable but instead reflects specific political choices and value-laden assumptions. The first paper examines how the AI Act constructs a particular vision of AI through its risk-based classification system, reinforcing specific political choices and particular visions of Europeanness. The second paper explores the role of ontological security, demonstrating that AI policies do not just regulate technology but also aim to provide a sense of stability in a rapidly shifting technological landscape.

What motivates my research is to critically examine how AI is framed, governed, and imagined, and to explore how things could be otherwise. Much of the current AI policy debate is framed in narrow, technical terms, focusing on terms like trust, risk, transparency, and explainability. At the same time, we also see non-governmental actors, particularly large technology companies, increasingly shaping these discussions. In this context, I am especially interested in how policies that appear neutral or solution-oriented actually reproduce and circulate implicit assumptions about what kind of AI – and what kind of society – we should be striving for. By unpacking these assumptions, our research contributes to challenging dominant narratives and opening up space for alternative ways of thinking about AI governance and what kinds of future are made possible or foreclosed through it.

Katja: Thank you so much, Bao-Chi, for sharing these reflections. We’re inspired not only by your research but also by your openness in discussing the academic process. Your insights on collaboration, writing, and peer review offer valuable lessons for all of us dealing with the complexities and often pressures of scholarly publishing.

Evoking cuerpo-territorio (body-territory) to reflect on urban data, or lessons from Abya Yala*

by Rafaela Cavalcanti de Alcântara

Picture 1: América Invertida, credit: Joaquín Torres García, retrieved from Wikimedia Commons

The first place I occupy in the world is my own body. The fact that I am a female, non-white migrant relying on a research visa to live in Austria is crucial to understanding how I see my research object and field. This perspective has been informing my academic studies and, consequently, my PhD research, in which I have been seeking to understand the interactions between bodies, data, and urban policies. Thus, my academic reflections, inevitably, are influenced by my Latin American female body, which is not necessarily welcomed in certain spaces in and outside Europe. Of course, it is not about my own body only.

This is because I must engage with other experiences and bodies to understand the complexities of living in the cities. The experiences of favelas’ inhabitants, members of the Palestinian diaspora or delivery app workers, for instance, will carry with themselves specificities in terms of their access to the urban environments they inhabit and the possibilities of living there as they wish. That said, I want to be transparent about whose existences I am concerned about when it comes to the increasing use of data to define urban policies: I am worried about those who are undocumented, disabled, trans, nonbinary, racialized, female, feminized, queer; the ones seen as ‘the others’ or ‘less human’ according to Western hegemonic thinking; the ones even unseen; the bodies that carry out low- and unpaid work; the ones that are often labeled by police forces as suspects of criminal offenses; those who are repressed when taking to the streets for their agendas, those that are deemed as ‘illegal’ or not welcome by state or conservative forces.

The deployment of big data in urban contexts is surrounded by several plans and goals: the improvement of urban safety, promotion faster automobile traffic, saving of energy consumption in public lighting — to mention only a few. Bearing in mind the scenario fostered by data-driven urbanism (Kitchin, 2017), I argue that body-territory helps me to challenge ‘one-size-fits-all’ big data promises. ‘Body-territory’ claims that “it is impossible to cut apart and isolate the individual body from the collective body, the human body from the territory and landscape” (Gago, 2020). In this sense, I see body-territory as essential to problematize and challenge official speeches data-driven solutions as silver bullets to solving city issuesThe examples introducing this paragraph, for instance, raise some immediate questions, such as: Which bodies feel safer when a city’s common spaces are surveilled and monitored by public security forces? Who — and whose interests — benefit most from the traffic lights installed to make individual car drivers’ lives easier? Does automated public lighting meet the needs of female, feminized or queer bodies moving  through the city when it is dark?

The Right to the City is a statement and call within urban debates. Introduced by Lefebvre in 1968 and translated into English in 1996 (Lefebvre, 1996), it claims that people have the right to interfere in urban life, making and remaking the city, participating and appropriating it according to collective needs (Lefebvre, 1996; Harvey, 2008). Since hegemonic discourses on big data often present it as an objective, evidence-based resource to overcome “urban problems,” I want to raise awareness about how those narratives may picture and focus on a single standardized idea of ‘urban citizen.’ Citizens that inhabit the datafied city are not homogeneous: their existences in urban space are embodied and territorialized, which should be taken into consideration when big data becomes a central player in urban planning.

Since the body-territory promotes a de-liberalization of the notion of the body as individual property, specifying an “epistemological continuity [,] of the body as territory” (Gago, 2020), I believe that this Latin American concept can also be useful to analyze European cities. This is also because body-territory challenges “the masculine naturalized as the universal” since it is a concept that “can be postulated as an image that is antagonistic to the abstract character required by the individual property owner of (neo) liberal modernity,” as described by Gago (2020). It reminds us that all bodies should be considered, and that they cannot be seen as abstract since they are situated and territorialized. Thus, when applied to European cities, the concept of the body-territory can be used to challenge some big data narratives that ignore the fact that experiences in urban spaces are both embodied and territorialized, mainly because bodies and territories are intertwined.

Therefore, the notion fosters the idea that understanding the complexities of urban life requires an analysis that goes beyond looking at the individual only. My point here is to argue that overcoming (neo) liberal views of what an ‘individual’ can be, means also overcoming an abstract and individualistic idea about the ‘urban citizen’, who is constructed in institutional narratives and is essential when thinking about ‘digital’, ‘smart’, and ‘datafied’ cities. Body-territory addresses some of my concerns since the concept helps me to elaborate on the idea that data-driven urban policies may potentially ignore some embodied certain urban experiences if urban data management reproduces claims — or illusions — for a so-called ‘objectivity.’ As for the latter, if a city police is built over a single idea of ‘city inhabitant,’ it may, for instance, base itself solely on data traffic informing motorized vehicles flows towards downtown instead of taking into consideration female pedestrians that move throughout their neighborhoods to carry out care work. 

Body-territory has been built by feminist, indigenous, peasant, and other social movements throughout Abya Yala. Gago states that the body-territory expands the way of seeing (2020), which, in dialogue with Haraway’s perspective on situated knowledges (Haraway, 1988), leads me towards an approach that considers the ones that are “not allowed not to have a body” (Haraway, 1988, p. 575), fostering my own epistemological turn towards ‘smart cities’ or ‘urban data platforms’. If bodies carry with themselves the territories they inhabit,[1]2 ‘body-territory’ helps to think about a complex scenario that seems to not be easily represented in data-driven decisions.

This said, body-territory is a powerful tool to expand debates around, for instance, what authors have been referring to as “the right to the digital city”, “the right to the smart city”, and “the right to the datafied city” (Bria & Morozov, 2018; Cardullo et al., 2019). This is a connection that becomes even more evident for me when I recall Harvey’s (2020, p. 23) words stating that the right to the city goes beyond a right of individual access to the city resources since it “depends upon the exercise of a collective power to reshape the processes of urbanization”.

There is a long path to walk, of course, which includes looking at what has been done. It is important to recall, for instance, that the Data Commons Manifesto states that “Data is not neutral or unbiased, so it must bear a critical, political and ethical analysis” (Bass & Old, 2020, p. 59). What I desire is questioning liberal notions that may have been preventing us from seeing beyond data promises.


*Abya Yala ou Abiayala is the term in Kuna language given to the continent officially named as America. Over time, the term Abya Yala has been deployed by indigenous movements to refer to this territory, replacing its eurocentric name.

[1] See the card “Bodies Territories” at the Oracle for Transfeminist Technologies, available at https://www.transfeministech.codingrights.org/

Author Biography

Rafaela Cavalcanti de Alcântara is currently a researcher at the Institute of Technology Assessment of the Austrian Academy of Sciences and a PhD candidate at the STS department of the University of Vienna. She has been connecting feminist science and critical data studies to other feminist scholarship – primarily historical materialist and Latin American – to elaborate on the interaction between body-territories, big data, and welfare.  

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References

Bass, T. & Old, R. (2020). Common Knowledge: Citizen-led Data Governance for Better Cities. Decode. European Union. https://www.nesta.org.uk/report/common-knowledge-citizen-led-data-governance-better-cities/

Bria, F. & Morozov, E. (2018). Rethinking the Smart City. Democratizing Urban Technology. Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, New York Office. https://www.rosalux.de/publikation/id/38134/die-smarte-stadt-neu-denken  

Cardullo, P., Di Feliciantonio, C. & Kitchin, R. (Eds.) (2019). The Right to the Smart City. Emerald Publishing Limited.

Cruz-Hernández, D. T. (2016). Una Mirada Muy Otra a los Territorios-cuerpos Femeninos. Solar, 12(1), 35-46.

Gago, V. (2020). Feminist International: How to Change Everything. Verso.

Haraway, D. (1988). Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective. Feminist Studies, 14(3), 575-599. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3178066 

Harvey, D. (2008). The Right to the City. New Left Review, 53, 23-40. https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii53/articles/david-harvey-the-right-to-the-city

Kitchin, R. (2017). Data-driven Urbanism. In Kitchin, R., Lauriault, T.P., & McArdle, G. (Eds.). Data and the City (p. 44-56), Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315407388 

Lefebvre, H. (1996). The Right to the City. In H. Lefebvre, Writings on Cities (1st ed., pp. 61–181). Blackwell.

Europe’s Quiet Race to Space – European Space Futures and the Question of Public Ignorance

1. Watching Ariane 6 launch from a safe distance in Kourou, French Guiana (Credit: ESA)

by Allesandra Penders

In September of this year, one week into joining the FutureSpace research project – just as the project celebrated its first anniversary – I found myself taking notes in a Strategic Foresight Workshop hosted by the FutureSpace team members, attended by many important actors in the European space sector, including members of the European Space Agency (ESA) and the European Space Policy Institute (ESPI). Throughout, multiple participants voiced their surprise at, and concerns about, how little the public knows about space and our present-day space capabilities. Their observations are echoed in recent surveys and reports on the European public’s awareness of space-based activities, which indicate that although positive sentiments towards investing in space are most common, only a minor percentage are actually well-informed about European space activities (ESA, 2019; ESPI, 2023; Europe Barometer, 2014). When this point was raised, as a newcomer to the project and the Social Studies of Outer Space (SSOS) field more broadly, I certainly felt like a representative of this largely ignorant public. Despite a subconscious, common-sense knowledge that we are extremely reliant on space technologies as a society, I, like many others, do not often stop to think about the materialities behind such infrastructures.

Even if you have not been keeping up with space news, like me, you may have come across claims that ‘a new space race is in full swing.’ At present, there is indeed a wealth of public and private actors actively working towards ambitious outer space projects in the midst of intensifying international competition. As opposed to the Apollo era, the current period of space exploration – the ‘new space race’ or the ‘new space age’ – is characterized by the shift away from state-led space activities towards the rise of the private, commercial sector and subsequent public-private partnerships. SpaceX, Blue Origin, and other so-called “NewSpace” private enterprises, aim to capitalize on the promise of outer space as a novel economic frontier – encompassing satellite communication networks, space tourism, space mining, human settlements on the Moon and Mars, and other socio-technological schemes (Tutton, 2018). These changes are consequently accompanied by issues such as space debris, as satellites are being put into orbit at an unprecedented rate (Starlink plans to have 29,988 orbiting satellites next year), leading to crowded orbits and potential collisions; ecological impacts and the continuation of colonial practices, as resource-rich celestial bodies become sites for resource extraction; or questions surrounding dual-use technologies, as space infrastructures are employed for both civilian/scientific and military/security purposes, (e.g. satellite imagery). Simultaneously, China, India, and Russia are each independently advancing military operations in outer space, as the U.S. pushes for returning astronauts to the Moon with the Artemis programme.

While one could argue that the label of a ‘new space race’ is currently being used as “a catch-all term” in space news – with “virtually every single article reporting on any aspect of space, whether that be satellite launches of non-Western nation states, information regarding private sector activities, [or] mundane economic news of space investment” relying on the term’s power to harken back to the iconic legacy of the Cold War and its zeal for space developments (Minenor-Matheson, 2023, pp. 89-90) – one should also ask: “What does it say about the present that [such] stale expansion phantasms have again become ubiquitous?” (Geppert, 2021, p. 375). The prevalence of such aggrandized talk raises questions surrounding the attempted revival of space keenness in the first place within this new context of dominant profit incentives and market-driven logics, as well as an increased focus on the militarization of space.

2. Ariane 6 the day before its first launch on 9 July 2024 (Credit: ESA)

In other words, regardless of the ‘space race’ buzzword’s truthiness, it seems space has indeed once again – albeit differently – been framed to invoke narratives of international competition and antagonism, and importantly, of global winners and losers – with political and material effects in tow.

Europe is certainly feeling the pressure. The (illusion of) competition in the new space race narratives and the rise of NewSpace has evidently lit a fire under Europe’s space sector, as European institutions and actors seek to promote their own visions for human futures in outer space. In November 2021, the Director General of ESA stated his aim for “European footprints” on the Moon by 2030, which would “become a new economic space, and a new continent” of human activity (“Bis Zum Ende”, 2021). Additionally, consider the case of the joint Ariane rocket programme. Created in 1979 by 13 collaborating European nations, partially to ensure autonomous European access to outer space (Al-Ekabi, 2015), Ariane has been heralded as a symbol of successful European integration on a political, technological, and economic level (Harvey, 2003). Hence, its commercial success was arguably not prioritized, as the programme instead stuck to the geo-return principle, which ensured every nation participating in building different rocket parts received its fair share of industry contracts. However, today this principle and other pillars of European scientific, technological and political integration are increasingly contested in the face of the previously mentioned rise of American NewSpace actors. Due to the felt pressure of an unprecedented global competition for space launches and access to space, Ariane is now increasingly seen as too expensive and with a bureaucratic governance system too complex to keep up with the speed of disruptive innovation set by its commercial competitors. Consequently, narratives that Europe is ‘lagging behind’ and needs to ‘catch up’ in the global race have become widespread. In this uniquely crucial and transformative moment in the history of (European) space exploration, the FutureSpace project studies how space future visions are shaped by particular European value constellations and, in turn, how European outer space infrastructures and space policy are co-produced by these shared visions in advancing processes of political (dis)integration (Klimburg-Witjes, 2023). Following Ariane around to construction sites, policy conferences, foresight departments and trade fairs, FutureSpace focuses on the entanglements of the imaginative, material, and political dimensions of European space activities, towards understanding how futures of European integration on and off-planet are imagined and performed (Jasanoff & Kim, 2015).

In its first year, the FutureSpace team– Asst.-Prof. Dr. Nina Klimburg-Witjes, Dr. Joseph Popper, Philipp Kürten, and Kai Strycker – has already researched a variety of topics under the European space sector, including the issue of space debris in Earth’s orbit; sociotechnical imaginaries of strategic autonomy in controversies about Ariane; topographies of Earth-Space relations and scalar narratives in the European space sector. Following the European space controversies mentioned in the previous paragraph, FutureSpace research found that positions tend to polarize around two narratives for future integrations. The first urges for a more united European approach and a reinforced commitment to Ariane, organized under the framework of ESA. The second argues for a dis-integration of the existing European launcher program in favor of creating more agile alliances between the corporate sector and a few powerful countries. This debate further reflects important and prevalent tensions between unity and plurality, and between cooperation and competition. In both cases, the emerging NewSpace ecosystem is transforming the politics of space in Europe, and complicates the relations between the national, international, and supranational institutions currently responsible for European space futures (Klimburg-Witjes, 2023). In sum, the FutureSpace research is the first of its kind in linking the rocket, and the future imaginaries it inspires, to forms of governance, engineering practices, and value constellations in multinational infrastructure projects. In doing so, FutureSpace advances the state of the art in three areas, namely Science and Technology Studies, Infrastructures Studies, and SSOS, thereby contributing to novel and highly relevant interfaces between them.

Having established the glaring relevance of understanding contemporary outer space infrastructures and the significance of research into this topic, the question remains: Why do I – and evidently, so many other Europeans – then know so little about such important space-related endeavours? Intuitively, one could easily suggest plausible reasons for the public’s ignorance about European space endeavours, such as the inherently “complex nature of space and space-related activities, including space science, -policy, -technology, and -applications” (Pieterse, 2020, p. 15), which is difficult to communicate to lay persons. Or, perhaps this ignorance is a byproduct of the modern ‘attention economy’, in which an overload of accessible information has led to increased difficulties of ‘breaking through’ in media environments – an issue that has been discussed by many researchers of science communication (Jamieson et al., 2017). To be sure, for the average citizen, it is difficult to gauge which space-related headlines warrant attention or concern, or which new launches are considered illustrative of a progressive development in space capabilities, as opposed to merely conducting ‘business as usual’. Particularly, considering real-life space exploration has become “an unexciting endeavor” for the public, as evidenced by a lack of ‘iconic’ moments in the collective memory, as opposed to the Apollo generation (Geppert, 2018, p. 310). Even the more ambitious promises for space exploration that have the potential to garner public interest – often attributed to NewSpace companies – suffer from the effects of a delayed payoff, and in today’s competitive attention economy, small incremental updates and long wait times for noteworthy results lead to a boy-who-cried-wolf condition, in which the public sentiment becomes: ‘You know what? Just let us know when we get there.’ From ESA’s perspective, one can imagine how a lack of public awareness and enthusiasm for space results in a lack of public funding, inhibiting the work that ESA could carry out. From this perspective, in line with much of the work in science communication and public engagement research, public ignorance is an undesirable risk. However, one could argue that public ignorance may be beneficial for ESA in certain cases, as awareness also comes with nosiness, questioning, and criticisms. For example, to remain evasive of public backlash, ESA may prefer that people remain unaware of issues surrounding space debris or dual-use technologies. But even in the case of less contested space endeavors, one can imagine how public awareness is not preferred, for example in questions of resource allocation. Although writing about the American context, Pieterse’s (2020, p. 20) observation about the irony in the public engagement with space is applicable here: “[The people] expect [the national space agencies] to be leading within the space arena, but express their outrage at the resources allocated to it, whilst indifferent as to the value of space technology.” Perhaps it would be in ESA’s best interest to let its space activities fade into the shadows of public consciousness so as to not remind them that public funding is being funneled into space exploration as well. (For reference, a survey from a few years ago indicated that the European public’s estimations for public resource allocation into space activities are already around twenty times higher than they actually are (ESA, 2019), a gross overestimation that cannot be easily corrected when public communication is already lacking.) Therefore, rather than an unintentional ignorance springing from contemporary communication conditions, is there a strategic and purposeful element to keeping the European public oblivious about what ESA is up to?

Indeed, my intuition is corroborated in the following excerpt from an interview[1] with an ESA official:

People do not know much about space, but they are not against [space investment]. If explained, then they say ‘Oh, it’s good, fine – do it.’ (…) We are in a good and comfortable position with this portfolio, that it’s not objected and challenged. (…) As long as we are not hindered to do our work for Galileo[2], Copernicus[3], and so on, [and] nobody knows that on the street, then it’s fine. And we should keep that on such a non-excited level.

As evidenced by earlier sentiments, and as the Ariane rocket has been referred to as “the most boring rocket” (personal communication), I believe it is safe to say ESA successfully maintained this public non-excitement. Additionally, it is important to note the discrepancy in the interviewee’s claims that, on the one hand, once the purposes of space activities are explained and made known to the public, people tend to be okay with these activities being carried out, and on the other hand, keeping the public generally ignorant is beneficial as it evades obstructions to the work done by ESA. What is particularly interesting here, is also this notion of ‘non-excitement’. This maintained ignorance among the public is thus not one produced through secrecy or the withholding of information, but rather, it is an obliviousness produced through strategic boringness. It is a strategy of not communicating information to an audience by employing boringness under the guise of communicating information to an audience – or the Terms and Conditions approach.

Such preliminary musings remain underdeveloped for now, but warrant future research. As the FutureSpace project continues to shed light on European space futures, it is important to consider the public’s role in the shaping of such futures, especially if space remains represented as a shared common, for all humankind. During my remaining time as an intern at the FutureSpace project, I return to my initial ignorance – my impetus to join FutureSpace in the first place – and take it as a starting point rather than a hindrance to my entry into the SSOS field, as I aim to provide a first foray into this exploratory topic of (strategic) public ignorance and the European space sector. 

3. Allesandra Penders (centre) and the FutureSpace project team in Vienna, September 2024 (Credit: FutureSpace)


[1] This interview with an ESA official was conducted in 2019 by Dr. Nina Klimburg-Witjes for the research project “Making Europe through and for its research infrastructures” at the University of Vienna.

[2] ESA’s Galileo mission is Europe’s independent global navigation satellite system.

[3] ESA’s Copernicus mission consists of a constellation of satellites providing Earth observation data, monitoring the planet’s environment and climate.

Author Biography

Allesandra Penders is a master’s student in the interdisciplinary Cultures of Arts, Science and Technology Research Master programme at Maastricht University. Allesandra previously completed her Liberal Arts and Sciences bachelor’s programme at Maastricht University (University College Maastricht), with a Social Sciences/Humanities concentration focusing on STS, Cultural Studies, Sociology, and (Digital) Media Studies. As part of her current master’s programme, Allesandra is doing an internship at the University of Vienna in the FutureSpace project, working as a research assistant.

References

Al-Ekabi, C. (Ed.). (2015). European Autonomy in Space (Vol. 10). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11110-0

‘Bis zum Ende der Dekade steht ein Europäer oder eine Europäerin auf dem Mond’ (‘By the end of the decade, a European will be on the moon’). (2021, November 26). Der Standard. https://www.derstandard.de/story/2000131455919/bis-zum-ende-der-dekade-steht-ein-europaeer-oder-eine

ESA. (2019, January 16). How much do European citizens know about space? https://www.esa.int/About_Us/Corporate_news/How_much_do_European_citizens_know_about_space

ESPI. (2023). EU space policy and the involvement of civil society. European Economic and Social Committee. https://www.espi.or.at/reports/eu-space-policy-and-the-involvement-of-civil-society/

Europe Barometer. (2014). European Attitudes to Space Activities (Summary). European Commission. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/1085

Geppert, A. C. T. (Ed.). (2018). Limiting Outer Space: Astroculture After Apollo (1st ed. 2018). Palgrave Macmillan UK?: Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-36916-1

Geppert, A. C. T. (2021). What is, and to what end do we study, European astroculture? In A. C. T. Geppert, D. Brandau, & T. Siebeneichner (Eds.), Militarizing Outer Space: Astroculture, Dystopia, and the Cold War (pp. 371–378). Palgrave Macmillan.

Harvey, B. (2003). Europe’s space programme: To Ariane and beyond. Springer; published in association with Praxis Pub.

Jamieson, K. H., Kahan, D., & Scheufele, D. A. (2017). The Oxford handbook of the science of science communication. Oxford university press.

Jasanoff, S., & Kim, S.-H. (2015). Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power. University of Chicago Press. https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226276663.001.0001

Klimburg-Witjes, N. (2023). A Rocket to Protect? Sociotechnical Imaginaries of Strategic Autonomy in Controversies About the European Rocket Program. Geopolitics, 1–28. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2023.2177157

Minenor-Matheson, G. (2023). Media and outer space. Imaginaries and discourses of the new space race. In A. Kaun & P. Åker (Eds.), Centering the Margins of Digital Culture (pp. 73–96).

Pieterse, E. (2020). Space and media. In A. Froehlich (Ed.), Outer Space and Popular Culture: Influences and interrelations (pp. 15–24). Springer.

Tutton, R. (2018). Multiplanetary Imaginaries and Utopia: The Case of Mars One. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 43(3), 518–539. https://doi.org/10.1177/0162243917737366

The luck of the draw: organising a blog by Tombola

On the mission to bring fresh life into “Reflections” and keep it closer to every day life at Vienna STS, there is now—in addition to the possibility to spontaneously submit posts—a preliminary schedule including all department members in the yearly blog-cycle. But how did the editorial team come up with such a schedule? Considering that a certain degree of chance and “luck” are inherent to life and work in academic research (Davies & Pham, 2023), what could be a more fitting way to schedule blog submissions than via a tombola! 

Last Thursday, the “Reflections” team came together to make the final draw: An Excel spreadsheet assigning numbers to members of the department staff (including blog editors, off course!) was used as the basis. Then, the team carefully numbered and folded paper slips and mixed them together in a ceramic bowl to ensure the utmost fairness and discretion. Members of the team took turns drawing numbers—two for each month of the ongoing year. The numbers were read aloud and the colleagues assigned to them were added to the respective cell in the spreadsheet. You can review the final product below, as well as documentation of the joyful process above.

The “Reflections” team is looking forward to working with all of our blog contributors this year! The team will soon reach out to those scheduled for the next months. In the meantime, we kindly ask department members to contact us via email in case there are any questions or concerns.

*** 2025 Blog Schedule ***

February Sarah and Alessandra

March Bao-Chau/Katja and Rafaela

April Jule and Noah

May Joseph and Sara

June Fredy and Philipp

September Carsten and Ulrike

October Roman and Livia

November Inge and Ariadne

December Sarah and Anastasia

January 2026 Max and Ange

February 2026 Millar and Nina


Reference

Davies, S. R., & Pham, B.-C. (2023). Luck and the ‘situations’ of research. Social Studies of Science, 53(2), 287-299. https://doi.org/10.1177/03063127221125438

New book! Announcing Science Societies: Resources for Life in a Technoscientific World

by Sarah R Davies

I am thrilled to announce the publication of a new book, titled Science Societies: Resources for Life in a Technoscientific World. As I write in the acknowledgements, this volume is inspired by my experiences teaching Science and Technology Studies (STS) to different audiences, and is an effort to draw together STS research on science, technology, and society to present an accessible account of how this knowledge can act as ‘resources for life in a technoscientific world’. My hope is that by synthesising scholarship on topics such as expertise, public participation in science, science in crisis and disaster, and the governance of science readers will be inspired to explore STS further and to critically engage with the role of technoscience in society. 

If you’re interested in these topics, the book is out in paperback and can be purchased at this site. You are also welcome to write to sarah.davies@univie.ac.at for further details!